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U.S.-Developing Countries: From Traditional Neocolonialism to Asymmetrical Interdependence

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[Article by Rudolf Ivanovich Zimenkov, doctor of economic sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] The processes occurring in the world in the last 15-20 years have introduced serious changes into the form and the content of the United States' economic relations with the developing countries. The system of U.S. neocolonialism encountered barriers which restricted the earlier model of interrelations, and even made its continued existence impossible in some cases. This was due to a whole group of factors, and the main one was the developing countries' more important role in world economics and politics.

New Features of Economic Interrelations

The emerging countries have ceased to be objects of international relations and have become the subjects of these relations. They have been quite successful in national economic development. The average annual growth rate of the industrial product in the developing world from the 1950s through the 1980s exceeded the indicators of the United States and other developed capitalist states. As a result, their share of the GDP of the capitalist world rose from 17 percent in 1950 to 25 percent in 1989, their share of agricultural production rose from 48 to 59.3 percent, and their share of industrial production (extractive and processing industries and power engineering) rose from 13.2 to 25.5 percent, including a rise from 8.6 to 17.1 percent in manufacturing.¹

The growth of production was accompanied in most countries by the diversification and evolution of their economic structures, the consolidation of the material and technical base of the economy, especially in industry, the inter- and intra-sectorial integration of the main subdivisions of the economy, and the expansion and consolidation of the domestic market. These processes coincided with the creation and improvement of a national mechanism of expanded reproduction and the establishment of the necessary material prerequisites for the achievement and consolidation of economic autonomy and for more intensive and comprehensive inclusion in the system of international division of labor.² All of this contributed to the growth and diversification of exports of manufactured goods, which began to influence world sales markets perceptibly. Successful competition with the developed states was recorded in several areas, and this can be regarded as one of the most tangible results of the industrialization of the developing countries.

During their years of independence the developing countries have devised several effective ways of counteracting the economic pressure of the United States and other Western countries. Although they have not been able to neutralize some of the adverse effects of activity by foreign capital or to limit its power in their national economies

sufficiently, they have managed to institute stricter government control of this activity so that it serves national interests.

We must not forget that the developing countries do not constitute a homogeneous entity. There is an intense process of differentiation within the group, and this influences the form and content of economic relations with the United States. In the 1970s the group of oil-exporting states became a distinct separate entity and began playing an important role in the world capitalist economy, changing the nature of relations with the United States and other countries. In the 1980s several states surpassed most of the others in terms of growth rates and began playing an increasingly important role in the system of division of labor in the world capitalist economy. These countries—Singapore, Hong Kong (Xiang-gang), Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Mexico, and Brazil—with a rapidly growing export sector are known as the new industrial countries. In terms of average annual GDP and export growth rates, they left all of the industrially developed states, including the United States, Japan, the FRG, and Great Britain, far behind in the second half of the 1980s. Now they have not only become the partners of American firms, but are also competing with the United States in several traditional and advanced high-technology branches. They and the large developing countries with a multisectorial economy account for most of the United States' economic contacts with the Third World. Their increasing participation in the support of the reproductive process in the United States and the increasing dependence of countries on each other under the conditions of the internationalization of worldwide economic processes are forcing the United States to change its earlier model of economic ties with a large group of developing countries.

Under present conditions, Washington cannot even make many foreign policy decisions without considering the views of the developing countries, which have turned into an important factor in world politics. The emerging states are becoming more active in international affairs by organizing joint action and concerted effort, coordinating their views on the key issues of the present day, and seeking new and more effective forms of collective action. They are establishing various organizations to promote intergovernmental consolidation.

It is significant that the United States' economic relations with developing countries are not conducted in the confined area limited to the contacts between the leading capitalist country and the periphery of the world capitalist economy. The development of economic contacts between the Third World and the socialist countries and the inter-imperialist competition on the intergovernmental level and on the level of transnational corporations exert considerable influence. The United States' economic pressure on the emerging states is also limited substantially by the development of reciprocal economic contacts between Asian, African, and Latin American countries. Furthermore, profit is not always the immediate motive for the development of U.S. economic relations with the Third World. Many forms of contact are launched in pursuit of broader goals: the limited inclusion of the young countries in the world economy, the

channeling of their sociopolitical development in specific directions, the prevention of undesirable social conflicts for the United States in these countries, etc.

The forms of economic activity by American corporations are also changing. The new forms of international investment involved in the adaptation of TNC's to the conditions and requirements of developing countries continued to evolve in the 1980s. These are contracts which are not related directly to investment activity and which cover the spheres of industrial cooperation, the transfer of technology, managerial, sales, shipping, and information services, and contracting and subcontracting operations. The mixed companies established by American corporations with participation by local private or state capital, giving the latter a real opportunity to control the operations of the participating U.S. companies, are also more common.

The adaptation of American TNC's to the conditions of developing countries has been facilitated by the creation of export zones of "free trade" in these countries. In these zones the TNC's, or the mixed companies established with their participation, are exempt from taxes and customs duties and are granted certain privileges in payments for services, the use of infrastructural facilities, and the hiring of manpower. In 1987 there were more than 260 zones of this kind in 57 developing countries, as compared to 53 zones in 25 countries in 1980. The number of workers employed there rose to 1.3 million (as compared to 500,000 in 1975), and more than two-thirds were women, which did much to solve the crucial problem of female employment in the Third World countries. At the end of the 1980s the value of the export goods produced in these zones exceeded 10 billion dollars, and exports increased at a rate of 15 percent a year over the last 10 years—i.e., a rate far in excess of the average indicator for the developing countries.³

Qualitative changes in the United States' economic relations with developing countries were the result of the restructuring of the American economy in the 1980s. Its move from assembly-line production to the automated flowlines in the technological method of production did much to eliminate the forms of economic relations that had prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s.

On the one hand, the establishment of the new technological method of production required American capital to organize a production structure and market in the emerging states and seek effective ways of augmenting their economic potential. This became necessary because the United States occupies a leading position in the foreign trade of many developing countries and supplies them with over 60 percent of their imported modern technology, more than 30 percent of their imported machines and equipment, and around 50 percent of their imported foods. Radical changes in the system and methods of producing these goods and qualitative changes in the financial sphere objectively necessitated U.S. participation in the technological modernization of the economies of developing countries. The growing technological gap between the United States and the Third World, a result of the policy of neocolonialism, had become

inconvenient for the United States because it reduced its foreign markets and increased the cost of developing these markets.⁴

On the other hand, there were new requirements on means of production and consumer goods in the American economy. The quality requirements of goods produced in the United States and, consequently, of the technology of their production rose far above the requirements of the 1960s and 1970s. The reduction of the relative, and in some cases the absolute, consumption of fuel and many types of raw materials by the American economy, the more extensive use of new construction materials and resource-saving technologies, the overhead-cost-cutting programs of U.S. companies, and the automation of the technological processes of production are introducing perceptible changes into requirements on the quantity and quality of traditional raw materials and finished goods imported from the Third World countries. This is forcing the developing countries to become part of the new world technological order through the mechanism of world economic ties.

Mechanism of Asymmetrical Interdependence

Changes in the content of the United States' economic relations with developing countries have essentially led to a situation in which the United States (just as other Western countries) has had to base its relations with the emerging states primarily on economic considerations—i.e., in line with natural tendencies in the movement of capital and its international implications.

This transformation means that economic ties have ceased to be a system in which the economies of emerging states must serve U.S. interests and have become a system of interdependent economic relations with varying degrees of asymmetry encompassing all of the main forms of economic ties. This limits opportunities for the pursuit of the policy of neocolonialism, and even makes it impossible in many cases.

Under the conditions of the internationalization of the world economy, the activities of American TNC's—the main subjects in the export of capital in the form of direct investments—heightened the interdependence of the United States and the developing countries. The American TNC's became deeply involved in the national economies of many Third World countries in an attempt to subordinate these economies to the interests of their own reproductive process: In 1989 their direct private investments amounted to 90.5 billion dollars. More than 12,000 subsidiaries of American TNC's, with around 2 million employees, are located in the developing countries. Their total assets (with the exception of bank assets) amounted to 255.3 billion dollars in 1989, their total sales amounted to 195.3 billion, and their profits on invested capital amounted to 17.5 billion dollars. The enterprises of these subsidiaries produced more than 10 percent of the industrial exports of the developing countries in the second half of the 1980s.⁵ The combination of financial strength and the control of new equipment and technology has allowed the TNC's to stimulate the particular forms and patterns of production specialization in the emerging states that serve U.S. interests.

The system of division of labor the United States created, however, established new patterns of interdependence. The emerging states, especially the new industrial countries, are becoming direct participants in the reproductive process in the world economy. In 1988, for example, South Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico sent 36.2 percent, 40.7 percent, and 94 percent of their exports respectively to the United States. Other developing countries are also exporting large quantities of goods to the American market. In the second half of the 1980s the United States accounted for 20-40 percent of the exports of Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, India, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In 1980-1988, 74 percent of the industrial exports of developing countries to developed capitalist states were sent to the United States.⁶ Furthermore, many of the products of the processing industry in the young states, manufactured with American technology, competed with the goods of U.S. corporations in their domestic market.

American capital's vigorous penetration of the economies of developing countries had a significant effect on the growth rates and structure of monopolies in these countries, serving as the strongest catalyst in the creation of these monopolies.

In the 1980s the national monopolistic associations in the developing countries began to play a more perceptible role in the domestic economy and in the world capitalist economy as a whole, moving quickly onto the international scene. Whereas the list of the 500 largest industrial companies in the capitalist world did not include a single corporation in the developing countries in 1975, the 1987 list included 26 companies in 11 countries, including 10 in South Korea, 5 in India, and 3 in Brazil. Each had a sales volume of over 2 billion dollars and assets of more than 3 billion and each employed more than 50,000 people. The fact that companies in developing countries have joined the world industrial elite attests to the substantial growth of their international significance and active participation in world economic ties.

Large firms in the Third World are vigorously expanding their operations in foreign markets, including the U.S. market. Total direct investments in the U.S. economy reached 31 billion dollars in 1989, and the direct capital investments of some countries (Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Liberia) in the American economy exceeded or were almost equal to U.S. direct capital investments in their economies.

The processing industry is becoming the priority sphere of investments by developing countries in the U.S. economy, largely in connection with the active promotion of the products of this branch in the young states in the American market. Around one-fifth of all of the capital investments of developing countries in the American economy were concentrated in the U.S. processing industry at the end of 1989, particularly in the electronic and chemical industries. The rest of the investments were concentrated in the oil and mining industries, the service sector, and real estate.⁷

The active penetration of the U.S. economy by Third World companies has created a sector controlled by the capital of developing countries, however small its dimensions might

be. In this way, exports of private capital have become an integral part of their foreign economic activity and are intensifying the transnationalization of economic affairs, which is contributing to the growing interdependence of countries.

The increasing interdependence of the United States and most of the developing countries is also attested to by the activities of American transnational banks (TNB's). The expansion of their credit operations, for example, led to the abrupt growth of the foreign debts of these countries and their payments to service these debts. In 1990 they reached the astronomical figure of 1.3 trillion dollars, or around half of the combined GNP of the developing countries. Their indebtedness to Western commercial banks exceeded 500 billion dollars, and more than one-fourth of the banking debts of developing countries were owed to American TNB's.

There is no question that the tremendous flow of capital into the developing countries allowed them to increase their total accumulations, maintain their solvency, carry out many important economic projects, and augment their imports of industrial equipment and new technology and thereby contributed to their socioeconomic development, but their debts also rose at a rapid rate, and this was particularly evident at the time of the debt crisis of the 1980s. The developing countries had to use one-fifth—and more than one-fourth in the case of some Latin American and African countries—of their export revenues to make payments on their debts. These payments became a factor impeding the development of the emerging states.

Under the conditions of increasing interdependence, the problem of foreign indebtedness is having a destabilizing effect on the entire system of world economic relations. The exacerbation of the foreign debt problem has an adverse effect on the state of the economy in the Third World, complicates the activities of U.S. transnational capital, and restricts some channels of production and scientific-technical cooperation. The deterioration of socioeconomic conditions in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean—the region with the highest foreign debts among the developing countries—reduced the volume of U.S. direct capital investments in these countries by 10.6 billion dollars between 1980 and 1985.

This situation also limits the United States' export markets. The efforts of the developing countries to solve their foreign debt problems forced them to limit imports of goods and services from the United States and the other developed capitalist states—their main trade partners. As a result, U.S. exports to emerging states decreased from 110 billion dollars in 1980 to 70 billion in 1984 (in constant 1984 prices),⁸ and this created great difficulties in various branches of the American economy, particularly agriculture. By the same token, the reduction of exports to developing countries contributed to the growth of the U.S. negative balance of payments. In addition, the reduction of American exports of machines and equipment to these countries reduced the number of people employed in the American economy by more than 500,000 just in 1981-1983.

The foreign indebtedness of the emerging states, caused partially by the expansion of American banks, also had a negative effect on the banks themselves, and eventually on the credit system in the United States, because it accounts for one-third of the combined debts of the Third World. The payment demands of the leading American banks alone are estimated at more than 110 billion dollars, and the combined capital of American private banks in the middle of the 1980s was exceeded perceptibly by the debts owed to them in Asian, African, and Latin American countries.

American banks are beginning to reconcile themselves to the fact that all of the debts of the developing countries are unlikely to be repaid in the foreseeable future. In many cases they have virtually been forced to agree to the partial payment of interest on loans and to cover it with new credits to insolvent debtors. These loans have amounted to several billion dollars in recent years. In addition, at the end of the 1980s many large TNCs substantially increased their reserves to cover possible losses connected with the loans to these countries. According to the JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, at the end of July 1987 the 50 largest U.S. banks increased their reserves by 16.7 billion dollars to cover losses of 12.9 billion.⁹ Apparently, American banks and banks in other Western countries will have to accept payments compatible with the maintenance of socially acceptable rates of economic growth for borrower-countries.

The probability of this approach is connected with the much higher degree of interdependence. Economic problems in the large debtor-countries and the exacerbation of social and political friction there could disrupt the normal functioning of the entire system of economic relations between the United States and the periphery of the world capitalist economy.

The interdependence of the United States and the developing countries is also seen clearly in the ecological sphere. Taking advantage of the absence of strict environmental protection laws in the developing countries, American and other Western corporations have frequently contributed to the deterioration of ecological conditions there. In particular, these practices have included the transfer of their ecologically hazardous production units to those countries, the unlimited clearing of tropical forests (each year tropical forests covering an area of 11 million hectares are cut down in the developing countries, and 6 million hectares turn into desert), shipments of ecologically hazardous goods banned for use in the domestic market, the illegal export and disposal of toxic chemicals and radioactive waste in the developing countries.

Negative environmental influences, however, not only disrupt the ecological balance within national boundaries, but also contribute to the deterioration of natural conditions on the global scale. Many of the forests and bodies of water in the United States, for example, are beginning to experience the adverse effects of industrial pollutants carried by air currents from Latin America. Stricter sanitary requirements are being imposed on various food products imported from the Third World, and the pollution of bodies of water, particularly in the Caribbean and the Atlantic, is causing American fishermen to lose some of their traditional fishing

areas. The ecological aspects of economic activity in the developing countries are arousing increasing concern in the United States in view of the interdependence of economic activity throughout the world.

The present realities of the interdependence of the United States and the emerging states are revealed most clearly in the relations between the leading capitalist country and the new industrial countries. The existing system of economic relations between these countries essentially serves as the model for the economic relations between the West (or North) and the South.

The rapid growth of these countries was connected primarily with profound changes in their economies. The Asian states, for example, made extensive use of capital and new technology from the United States and Japan for this purpose. Furthermore, the flexible system of state-capitalist economic regulation in the new industrial countries directed the activities of foreign capital toward the establishment of economic ties, conducive to their national economic development, between local companies and the TNCs of Western countries. The pursuit of a policy aimed at rapid economic development and geared to exports allowed their consumer goods to fill the gaps in the American market that had been formed when American corporations withdrew from production spheres in which overhead costs were far above the world average. Increasing their exports of manufactured goods to the American market, these countries redirected part of the consumer and production demand in the United States to their own production capacities. In this way, the interdependence of these countries and the United States took the form of the intermingling of capital and services, which evolved rapidly into the intersupplementary economic complexes of the United States and the most highly developed Third World countries.¹⁰

In the present system of economic interrelations, the relative status of the partners depends not only on amounts of capital and a monopoly on advanced technology, but also on the ability to do business, to use capital effectively, and to manage the market flexibly. The new industrial countries frequently play the leading role in this kind of partnership. Furthermore, this group of countries, with its combination of the advantages of relatively low wages and the efficient use of modern equipment and technology, purchased primarily from the United States and Japan, is actively expanding exports of goods to the American market. In the second half of the 1980s more than 40 percent of the exports of South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan and over 25 percent of the exports of Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia went to the United States. Furthermore, they consolidated their position or even occupied the dominant position in the case of some goods. As a result, the negative balance of U.S. trade with this group of countries has grown constantly since 1981. By 1988 it had climbed to 34.8 billion dollars, or 63.4 percent of the negative balance of U.S. trade with all of the developing countries.¹¹

Fierce competition with the Asian states forced the American administration to exclude South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore from the list of countries to which trade advantages are granted within the framework of the

general set of preferences in January 1959. Washington's move, however, cannot be viewed as a return to the neocolonial system of U.S. relations with the developing world. This decision gave these countries a status equal to that of Japan and the United States' trade partners in Western Europe. Furthermore, by doing this the United States stimulated their expansion of exports to the Japanese market—the main rival of the American TNC's. Another factor contributing to the reorientation of the export policies of these countries was the low exchange rate of their currencies in relation to the dollar at a time when the exchange rate of the Japanese yen in relation to the main currency of the capitalist world was rising rapidly. As a result, exports from the Asian new industrial countries to Japan rose from 11.4 billion dollars in 1985 to 24 billion in 1988. All of these figures testify that these countries are gradually becoming members of the upper echelon of the world capitalist economy, in which the main type of economic relationship is now the partnership based on the principles and mechanism of capitalist competition instead of neocolonial exploitation.

A certain degree of interdependence is also characteristic of U.S. economic relations with developing countries whose economic potential is based on the extraction and primary processing of raw materials. It is true that the "raw material" specialization of these countries gives them relatively limited opportunities to participate in international division of labor, but it also serves as the basis for a special set of economic relations with the United States. The nature of the partnership for the United States depends directly on the value of the raw materials, and the effectiveness of the partnership for the emerging countries stems from the acquisition of the currency, investment and consumer goods, and technology needed for national development from the United States. The developing countries with the most useful raw materials for the U.S. economy, particularly the oil-exporting countries, have been able to solve several acute socioeconomic problems with the aid of these economic relations. A modern infrastructure and several advanced branches of industry have been established in these countries, and they are using certain types of state-of-the-art technology.

Many other developing countries, however, have no resources of strategic importance to the United States. In addition, they have a low credit rating and, consequently, do not have a promising domestic market for sales of American goods and services and are of virtually no interest to most of the U.S. corporations. These countries, which do not produce any industrial or consumer goods needed by American companies and do not purchase these goods in the American market on a broad scale, are included in the process of reproduction in the United States only during periods of fierce competition for certain types of raw materials. This is one of the main reasons why U.S. trade with each of the countries of this group, most of which belong to the category of least-developed countries, did not exceed 40-50 million dollars a year in the 1980s, and why direct U.S. investments in, for example, the African countries south of the Sahara represented only 1.3 percent of all U.S. capital investments in the developing countries in 1989. The economic relations

of this group of countries with the United States are based mainly on American economic aid extended through government channels.

This does not mean, however, that the United States has no interest in countries playing a marginal role in supporting the reproductive process of American corporations or that it is prepared to withdraw from them, and there are important reasons for this. First of all, the United States, just as the other industrially developed states, has an objective interest in surmounting the underdevelopment of this group of countries instead of perpetuating it over the long range. After all, when any component of the complex mechanism of foreign economic ties between the center and periphery of the world capitalist economy begins to malfunction, as F. Elyanov accurately pointed out, "breakdowns capable of causing more serious difficulties in the future are inevitable. In view of this, the center obviously cannot leave the periphery to the mercy of fate. In the final analysis, by helping it, it helps itself."¹² In the second place, the deterioration of ecological conditions in these countries will complicate the already disturbing world ecological situation. This is another reason for the United States' concern about the problems of the least-developed countries. Third, the United States has an interest in preventing social upheavals leading to unpredictable changes. This is why the United States has granted this group of countries preferential trade conditions, increased the amount of preferential economic aid available to them, written off part of their foreign debts, deferred payments on some debts, and expanded the IMF-sponsored stabilization programs to preserve the "status quo" in the emerging states outside the sphere of reproductive ties with American and other Western capital.

All of these facts testify that the level of socioeconomic and cultural development of Third World countries is the main factor determining the nature of interdependence. Asymmetrical interdependence is certain to last a long time. Some of its elements will give rise to new problems in the future and some will promote genuine and sound partnership.

Footnotes

1. Calculated according to data in "Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics," New York, 1960; MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, August 1990.
2. "Sovremennyy imperializm: tendentsii i protivorechiya" [Contemporary Imperialism: Tendencies and Contradictions], Moscow, 1988, pp 528-529.
3. "Transnational Corporations in World Development. Trends and Prospects," New York, 1988, p 170.
4. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1988, No 10, p 123.
5. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, June 1990, p 36.
6. "Development and National Interest: U.S. Economic Assistance into the 21st Century," Washington, 1989, p 11.
7. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, August 1990, p 46.

8. P. Kuczynski, "Latin American Debt," Baltimore, 1988, p 101.

9. JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, 12 June 1987.

10. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, No 10, 1988, pp 125-126.

11. Calculated according to data in "Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade," December 1988.

12. MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1990, No 11, p 19.

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President and Public Opinion

92UF0146B Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 91 (signed to press 16 Sep 91) pp 23-33

[Article by Mira Mikhaylovna Petrovskaya, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] *In the contemporary American society the collection and processing of data on the political views and preferences of various social groups not only influence important government decisions, but also help to mold public opinion. For this reason, a leader hoping for a long political career must take all of the fluctuations in voter attitudes into consideration and always keep track of the exchange of information between the public and the power structure.*

Public opinion plays an important role in U.S. politics. President J. Kennedy called it "a basic constituent of power."¹ For this reason, it has to be taken into account when political decisions are made.

The need for political officials to take public opinion into account is not a myth. Even a dictatorship, according to V. Key, a prominent American expert in this field, cannot ignore public opinion completely. All governments, he remarked, take note of public opinion in one way or another, because they cannot rely solely on brute force to maintain their authority. Governments have to make certain that their policies are acceptable to the majority of citizens, and they want to win their support.²

The optimal relationship between public opinion and authority is thought to exist at the point at which government and the governed behave in accordance with the basic postulates of democratic rule. In this situation, the government is not a mirror reflection of public opinion, but a system serving the public interest conscientiously.

In a democratic society the daily exercise of power is based on communication between government and public opinion, with the electoral process serving as the main channel of this communication. Public opinion performs its oversight function most clearly in elections, because this is the only time it decides who will handle the reins of government.

The White House and the Institution of Public Opinion Polls

Various links of government have solicited the aid of public opinion polls at various times and have used their results to varying degrees. It is indicative that the White House was the first to use these polls. This is not surprising. Various newspapers began using primitive polling methods long ago to predict the winners of presidential elections. For this reason, presidential candidates not only kept track of the results of published polls, but also tried to base their campaign strategy and tactics on these results. As polling methods were perfected and various private firms began specializing in confidential polls for politicians, presidential candidates began soliciting their services. The use of computers turned the isolated surveys into a constant and integral element of any serious election campaign.

As soon as a candidate becomes president, he is immediately the focus of the attention of "pollsters" (from the English word "poll"), because one of the most common questions in public opinion polls asks respondents to evaluate presidential performance.

During the decades since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Gallup Institute has asked the population: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way () is performing his duties as president?" The Harris Service's version of the same question is the following: "How would you grade () on the performance of his duties as president (excellent, very good, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory)?" The results of these polls can be quite surprising.

"It is a well-known fact," S. Oskamp wrote, "that fluctuations in polling results can cause White House officials to shudder with fear or can lift the spirits of the president when they are favorable."³ Members of the White House staff always try to get the results of the polls of the Gallup Institute, Harris Service, and other leading firms before they are published. This gives them a chance to make the right decisions about the issuance of information about the White House, choose the right time for a presidential speech, etc.

During their term in office, presidents use the results of published polls and of confidential polls conducted specifically for them. It is not surprising that this occurs in the last year of a president's term: The president (if he intends to run again) is a candidate once more. The institution of pollsters serving the president on a permanent basis is a relatively new phenomenon, however, and is a result of the heightened interest of presidents in polling results throughout their term in office in recent decades.

Private pollsters had "penetrated" the White House even before G. Gallup published his first public opinion poll in October 1935. They did not, however, immediately win the trust of all subsequent presidents. In the 1950s, for example, in the Eisenhower era, neither side in the political struggle relied on the assistance of polling experts. It was not until 1960, in the Kennedy era, that the potential of polling services was fully appreciated, although the technical side of the matter was on a completely different level than in the 1980s and 1990s.⁴

After Kennedy used polls in 1960, the Democrats, who had shown nothing but contempt for polls until that time, began enlisting the services of polling firms as frequently as the Republicans.

In 1964 L. Johnson was so preoccupied with the results of polls recording his popularity that he hired O. Quale as his personal pollster. In 1968 R. Nixon conducted a more organized and efficient campaign than some of his predecessors, but he did not make sufficient use, according to some researchers, of the services of polling firms. Ronald Reagan was aware of the importance of polls and made use of them skillfully.

Polls, especially confidential ones, can help a presidential candidate in many ways: First of all, they inform him of the political attitudes of voters, which gives him a chance to determine the conditions under which he can expect a majority of the vote; second, they indicate the voters' opinion of the candidate. As L. Harris once said, voters frequently describe candidates to the organizers of polls in more candid terms than "the candidate could hear from his best friends."³ Third, these polls reveal the problems of the greatest concern to voters.

Polls influence the choice of the candidate's campaign strategy and tactics. Many researchers have acknowledged that polls also identify the wavering segment of the voting public and help the candidate choose the best way of winning its support.

An incident from L. Harris' experience is a truly classic example of the way in which polls keep a candidate from making irreparable mistakes by revealing voter attitudes. In 1960, when L. Harris was still a private pollster and was conducting surveys for J. Kennedy, he learned that the religion of the presidential candidate was giving rise to a great deal of rumor and speculation. The doubts about the Catholic candidate, according to Harris' data, had reached the point at which he might have lost the election if he had continued to remain silent on the matter. On Harris' advice, Kennedy opened the question to public debate and thereby won the support of many potential opponents.

On the threshold of the 1976 election, when Republican R. Reagan was still considering the possibility of running for president, he enlisted the services of polling expert R. Wirthlin, asking him to learn voter reactions to basic issues and analyze the Republic policy line since 1974. "We wanted to find out," Wirthlin said, "whether Republicans would support a candidate other than the incumbent (G. Ford) and to learn what kind of political advantage the President had."⁶ Confidential nationwide polls were conducted for this purpose, and the results were used to analyze the current situation and to make plans for the future.

Polls help candidates identify the problems of the greatest concern to voters. A poll conducted in New York in 1966, for example, revealed that the two most crucial issues were crime and drug addiction. They became the focus of N. Rockefeller's gubernatorial campaign. In particular, he proposed a program to control the traffic in illegal drugs. As a result, he won the support of the majority of voters in the state. The behavior of S. Agnew presents the opposite kind

of example. During the congressional campaign of 1970, he made general statements, without offering any specific suggestions geared to the voters' attitudes, and was consequently unable to win their support.⁷

Data on the financial expenditures on polling services attest to the strength of their present position in the political process. During the 1968 campaign, for example, Nixon spent at least 584,000 dollars on polls. The Democrats allocated a more modest sum for this purpose, but even this sum exceeded 280,000 dollars. In all, expenditures on polls connected only with the presidential campaign amounted to 1.5 million dollars. According to estimates, 1,200 confidential polls were conducted at the request of candidates for various offices in 1968 at a cost of around 6 million dollars.⁸ Most politicians regularly spend from 3 to 5 percent of their total campaign budget on opinion polls.

The nationwide poll was the main expenditure item in the presidential campaign. With a sample group of 1,500-2,000 people, the cost of a poll ranges from 40,000 to 50,000 dollars (regional polls cost 2,000 and up). The price of a single interview is around 25 dollars on the average if it is conducted in person and half as high over the telephone. The politicians who spend this much money to achieve their goals can take comfort in the knowledge that the clients of polling firms in the commercial sphere pay even more. A well-known tobacco company, for example, paid L. Harris 120,000 dollars for a nationwide poll (with a sample group of 4,000). This is the usual price for requests of this kind.⁹

Polling information, regardless of the source, is of great interest to the people who finance campaigns: No one wants to back a losing candidate. In 1968 Humphrey had great financial difficulties when Gallup and Harris polls in the earliest stages of the campaign showed Nixon far in the lead.

The information that the candidate has been too successful can produce the same result. In 1972 the polls showed that Muskie was far ahead of his rivals. This led to the considerable reduction of contributions to his campaign because people felt that he could win without additional funds.

Polling data on the leading candidate immediately arouse the interest of news correspondents. This candidate then receives extensive press coverage and political advertising. Journalists like to write about the probable winner. This naturally has an adverse effect on other candidates. At the beginning of 1972 G. McGovern's advisers complained that it was almost impossible for him to get the same press coverage as Senators Muskie and Kennedy, and all because, in their opinion, public opinion polls indicated that he was not popular enough at that time.

In the 1970s the polls recorded a new trend in public attitudes toward the president: Whereas earlier, according to D. Yankelovich's calculations, he could virtually count on the almost automatic agreement of at least 50 percent of the population with his programs, regardless of the nature of these programs, by the middle of the decade the figure had been reduced by half, and in some cases it was virtually zero.¹⁰ The skeptical opinion of presidential authority reflected the overall decline of trust in government, which was then quite apparent in the American society.

The disappearance of this "absolute loyalty" as a result of major failures in the performance of certain presidents does not mean that the public assigned less importance to the office of the presidency. According to majority opinion, the president of the United States is the leading figure in national foreign policymaking.¹¹ In spite of the disappointing performance of specific individuals, Americans view the president, who is elected by all of the people, as the only official defending the interests of the country as a whole. "In this sense," J. Kraft pointed out, "the president is the elected monarch of the country, our version of the king."¹²

Nevertheless, the skepticism of the public has made presidents more receptive to polling indicators. They keep track of evaluations of their own performance and changing levels of popularity, including their performance in the foreign policy sphere. In his study, R. Neustadt established a direct connection between indicators of presidential popularity with the general public and the attitudes of influential forces in Washington—congressmen, the leaders of political institutions and "influence groups," prominent correspondents, and others without whose support the president cannot perform his duties effectively.¹³

Political Consultants

Specialists with political experience and a thorough knowledge of social psychology plan strategy for presidential candidates. The growing role of opinion polls in U.S. politics was accompanied by a significant increase in the importance of the organizers of confidential campaign polls. Many of them ceased to be mere advisers and became the political consultants who organize and manage the campaigns of presidential candidates. The author of a special study of political consultants, S. Blumenthal, believes that one of their main duties is the persuasion of Americans to elect the politician they serve and then to keep him in office as long as possible. "In the 1980s no contender for a high-level position in the U.S. Government would take the risk of campaigning without hiring a political consultant," the author remarked.¹⁴

In contrast to the advertising corporations on Madison Avenue in New York which once "sold" presidential candidates to the American people "like a bar of soap," the new group has armed itself with political resourcefulness. With the aid of polls involving techniques unknown to outsiders, television advertising, and other means (frequently using the latest achievements of science and technology), they decide the course and pace of political campaigns. These wizards, who are better than anyone else at discerning and directing changes in public attitudes, are hired not only to secure election victories, but also to maintain the popularity of the politicians who have gained the offices they sought.¹⁵

Political consultants represent a new force in the American political system. They skillfully manipulate the voters, and sometimes the candidates as well, and influence the news media, demonstrating considerable control over the political preferences and views of the general public. It is their job to convince voters that a particular candidate for a high government office will be the best at realizing their own hopes and dreams.

The names of P. Hart, R. Wirthlin, and P. Caddell are usually mentioned in any discussion of the prominent figures making up the elite of the political consultants. The latter is probably the most famous. In 1972 Caddell "promised the presidency" to Carter and led him to victory in 1976. Toward the end of Carter's term, Caddell recorded the drop in his popularity and repeatedly warned the President and Rosalynn Carter that he would lose unless certain measures were taken. The speech Carter made in July 1979, just before the massive cabinet shake-up, is said to have been almost a word-for-word repetition of a speech Caddell drafted for Carter and of a speech Caddell himself had made in 1975. When all of this became known, the resulting publicity flooded newspaper editorial offices with letters from angry readers. "Why not," one of them wrote, "simply elect P. Caddell and save the cost of the other guy's salary?"¹⁶

As Carter's confidential pollster, Caddell could influence the President more than anyone else. Some people feel that it was on Caddell's advice that Carter spent too much time campaigning and not enough time running the country.

R. Wirthlin conducted polls for R. Reagan on a permanent basis (and was paid by the Republican Party, just as Caddell had been paid by the Democrats). Wirthlin had less influence, but he left a definite mark on the Reagan presidency. George Bush's pollster was Robert Teeter (who had also done this for him in 1980), and M. Dukakis' was Irwin Harrison.

There is every reason to believe that presidents will continue to have private pollsters and political consultants.

When political consultants became aware of their strength and the new possibilities the higher demand for their services had given them, they began discussing their methods and techniques more openly. The organizers of the 1980 campaign, for example, wrote several articles on their experience, including fairly frank discussions of the tactical methods that were used to gain the majority Reagan needed for victory.

Back in 1979 special nationwide surveys were conducted to learn the priorities of voters and the personality traits they found most appealing in a president. Six scenarios were composed for this purpose, each describing a different view of the future. The scenarios were worded in different tones, from the "moderate-restrained" point of view ("the less, the better") to the "active-assertive" one ("America could do more"). The results indicated that the active position was the most popular and that the Americans wanted to have leaders who would put the country "back on the right track."

Analyzing this campaign, Wirthlin said in one interview: "We had no doubt that if we could turn the campaign into a referendum on Carter's performance, we would win the election." Carter's pollster Caddell also realized this. "The organizers of Reagan's campaign," he said, "knew that they had to make Reagan look like a moderate. During the campaign many felt he was further to the right than the population as a whole, and some saw him as a rightwing extremist. These opinions had to be discouraged."¹⁷

The Republican consultant set several basic strategic goals: first, to not only strengthen the Republican base, but also expand it by winning the support of other voters (they included members of labor unions, Catholics, and southerners); second, to concentrate (by consolidating resources) on a few key states; third, to make leadership the central issue (polling results had indicated that Reagan was seen as a strong and determined man who would finish what he started—i.e., that he had the qualities which Carter seemed to lack and which underscored the weakness of his administration; there was a simultaneous emphasis on Reagan's personality); fourth, to save the bulk of campaign resources for the last 10-20 days before the election, which, judging by past experience, was the period deciding the outcome of the campaign. Accordingly, the Reagan campaign spent 6 million dollars on media coverage in the last 10 days to sway undecided voters. Attention was focused on the weaknesses of the incumbent, and the entire campaign was conducted like an expose.

In Wirthlin's words, each presidential campaign creates a unique set of circumstances, which must be studied and analyzed because they usually influence the election results.¹⁸ In the 1980 campaign, for example, the public supported a mandate for change. This mandate was not defined in specific terms. The only clear indication was the desire to have a strong leader who could get a handle on inflation. In reality, however, the ideas of the "New Deal," which had prevailed in the society since the middle of the 1930s, were being rejected by the public. The 1984 campaign revealed a different mandate, namely a desire to preserve the status quo.

Each president running for re-election has to keep track of his rating. The 1984 election was essentially a referendum on the performance of Reagan, who was running for a second term. He added certain new elements to his policy, and the 1984 election revealed the voters' approval of them.

Few nationwide surveys were conducted during Bush's 1988 campaign, in contrast to the 1980 and 1984 campaigns. Six were conducted, however, between June and October, and the polling grew more intense between 24 October and Election Day.

The pollsters concentrated on approximately 20 states that were considered to be the most important in securing an election victory. According to V. Brelio, "presidential campaigns essentially represent 50 coordinated but separate campaigns."¹⁹

A polling and data analysis office was set up on the advice of R. Teeter, who was responsible for much of the organizational side of Bush's campaign; another office would analyze and elaborate political positions and proposals, including the preparation and writing of speeches. This structure facilitated the interaction of those who measured public opinion with those who created the politician's image.

Information is an important force in politics, but experts feel that it is not the main one. The people who make the decisions have the final say. In the 1988 campaign these were George Bush and the professionals managing his campaign.

Political consultants paid special attention to the personality traits influencing voter preferences. To create an image of Bush in the voter's mind as a strong and determined leader, his own programs were publicized and the absence of these qualities in Bush's opponent was demonstrated in every way possible.

Elections and the Fabrication of Opinion

The increasing influence of pollsters on politicians is the subject of several studies by American authors. In particular, M. Barone investigated the degree to which private pollsters could manipulate politicians, and those could then manipulate voters.²⁰ This is also the subject of D. Broder's book.²¹ They do not share the worries frequently expressed by journalists and voters that the president or some other high-level elected official might be completely under the control of public opinion or the organizers of polls. "Polls are an instrument, and political pollsters are good mechanics at best. They are not our masters, at least not yet," Barone wrote.²²

All experts agree, however, that polls conducted confidentially offer broad opportunities for the misuse and manipulation of public opinion and its falsification. No one can be certain that the polling information released to the press comes from a reliable source or that it is complete. Polling data can also be manipulated on the highest level, and this is discussed, for example, in M. Peccanen's article "The Abuses and Fears of Polling Power."²³

In some rare cases the falsification of polling results has been investigated by the courts. During the 1964 presidential campaign, for example, FACT magazine published an article on the results of its poll of physicians, alleging that 1,198 psychiatrists felt that B. Goldwater was not fit to be president. After the campaign was over, Goldwater sued the publisher. Violations of polling procedures (the formulation of questions, the interpretation of results, etc.) were discussed at the trial. Renowned public opinion analyst B. Roper, a witness for the prosecution, proved that the necessary rules had not been observed when the poll was conducted and helped Goldwater win the case.²⁴

The occasional reports in the press of the results of surveys conducted by private firms (referred to in the American press as confidential "polling information leaks") can have serious political implications for a candidate, especially in view of the fact that information leaked to the press by a private source has sensational overtones from the start and therefore attracts more attention.

Nationwide surveys intended for publication can also play a significant role in the political career of a presidential candidate. Some politicians do everything within their power to influence the results of these polls. Knowing approximately when the leading firms conduct the nationwide polls, they strive to schedule their television appearances and press releases for that time and thereby influence respondents in the hope of raising their popularity rating by at least a few points.

A genuine hunt is launched, even on the highest level, for information about the results of polls before they appear in

the press. White House officials beleaguer polling organizations with requests for advance information about the president's rating, especially if they hear about the unfavorable results of Gallup or Harris polls. This generally inspires a positive article about the chief executive, which appears in the press at about the same time as the polling results, seemingly by coincidence.

The American political term "bandwagon effect" refers to the tendency of voters to take the side of the candidate in the lead.

There are two opposite points of view. Some politicians, especially those who take part in campaigns, and some journalists and sociologists assert that the publication of the results of opinion polls always produces this effect because of the psychologically justified desire of voters to back only the winner. Polling experts usually deny the existence of this effect. This is the point of view of researchers of public opinion and experts in other fields.

Gallup calls the "bandwagon effect" a myth. He says that the popularity of candidates who are shown to be far behind their rivals in opinion polls frequently increases (to varying degrees) during the campaign, and that the existence of the "bandwagon effect" would preclude this. Gallup asserts that he has never seen any evidence that this effect has influenced the behavior of voters in national elections. Harris says that if this effect did exist, all polls would be completely accurate, and this is known to be untrue. He recalls, in particular, that Nixon was ahead of Kennedy in the polls at the beginning of the 1960 campaign, but the winner, as we know, was the latter.

The well-known examples from American history in 1936 and 1948, when almost everyone predicted that A. Landon and T. Dewey would win the presidential elections but the winners were F. Roosevelt and H. Truman, are often cited in confirmation of the opinion that polls do not create the "bandwagon effect."

Some experts believe that the cause is mistaken for the effect in these discussions. If polls record a drop in the popularity of a candidate, this does not occur because the voters decide to support the leader; there are other causes, such as, for example, articles, commentaries, television appearances by opponents, and unfortunate public statements by the candidate himself.

The process by which the decision is made to choose a specific candidate is extremely complex. It is influenced by the person's social environment, his interest in politics, the issues raised during the campaign, the political image of the candidate, the affiliation of the voter and the candidate with certain groups in the society and their attitudes toward certain groups, political party traditions, etc. These factors are much more influential in the decisionmaking of voters than the publication of opinion poll results. For this reason, although the possibility of the "bandwagon effect" should be taken into account, it must not be examined in isolation from other factors and with no regard for the varying strength it displays in various situations.

"Enlightenment, Persuasion, and Mobilization of Opinion"

The president's skillful use of the news media gives him unique opportunities to communicate with the population of the entire country. This is why renowned journalist Tom Wicker said that one of the president's special powers was not recorded in the Constitution—"the power to command a huge audience virtually on request and appear before this audience in a variety of roles, creating the impression that he can play them all—from the manager of the economy to the supreme commander in chief." This power, Wicker wrote, "gives the president incredible advantages over his political opponents and over other branches of government in (public) opinion-making."²³

Throughout American history the preponderance of articles about the president in the news media, which was only relatively noticeable at the start, constantly grew more pronounced. According to some data, this interest in the president (judging by the amount of space he is allotted in newspapers) rose sharply after the world war. This was the result of the influence of strong presidents, but the tendency did not change even during the terms of weak presidents. For the sake of comparison, we can report that Congress never had the same amount of press coverage.²⁴

By virtue of his position, the president can attract the attention of all the media. Radio and television respond quickly to his requests to convey an important message directly to the people. There is always room in the press for his official statements. With the aid of his press conferences, the president can influence the way in which the most important events are reported. Furthermore, he is the source of much of this information.

The presidential press conference is a unique American institution. It allows the president to constantly "feed" various types of information to the media and also gives journalists a chance to "test" the president by asking him all types of questions about matters of public concern. American experts have remarked that there is no other country where the chief of state would subject himself to such grueling, and sometimes rude, interrogations by journalists. In addition, however, we must admit that this gives him a unique chance to influence public opinion.

The importance of the presidential press conferences has increased throughout our century. They came into being in the days of Theodore Roosevelt and reached their height under Franklin Roosevelt. In contrast to some of his predecessors, who had demanded that questions be submitted in advance, Roosevelt's discussions with reporters were spontaneous. He frequently gave correspondents additional information which was not for publication but which could be useful to them when they were writing articles. He was able to establish a working relationship with the press and to make press conferences an integral part of his job, an area in which he surpassed all earlier presidents.

The results of a president's efforts to mold public opinion depend on his personality and on the nature of his administration. Presidents with aggressive policies usually make extensive use of the news media to explain these policies and

mobilize public support for them. They can use public opinion to pressure Congress and influence the population for the purpose of winning approval for their policy line.

Acknowledging the important role of public opinion in the political process, J. Kennedy, for example, repeatedly pointed out the need to "enlighten, persuade, and mobilize opinion," using the news media and the political machinery at the president's disposal for this purpose.²⁷

When public opinion becomes known, particularly through polls, it gives the president a chance to make decisions on a rational and democratic basis, because "democracy necessitates effective and reliable dialogue between government and the governed."²⁸ In the words of C. Roll and A. Cantril, public opinion polls "can strengthen the democratic process considerably by providing the people with another way of making their views known."²⁹ G. Gallup shares this belief. Democracy, in his opinion, is strengthened by the polls, because they give the people a means of regularly expressing their views and wishes. Gallup said: "We must always remember that polling organizations are simply fact-finding agencies. They have nothing to do with what happens to these facts later."³⁰

In the American democratic system, therefore, polls represent an important instrument guaranteeing an effective and irreplaceable channel of communication between decision-makers, primarily the president, and the public. They can provide a fuller understanding of social and political processes in the society.

When we analyze the interaction of presidential power and public opinion, however, we must bear some of its important characteristics in mind. There is no question that it is multidimensional. The failure to take this important feature into account sometimes leads to unjustifiable inclinations to judge the role of public opinion solely by the results of opinion polls. This oversimplifies the overall picture and distorts all assessments of the state of public opinion and the actual role it plays. Besides this, public opinion itself is displayed with varying degrees of intensity at different times. Finally, the correct assessment of the significance of channels for the transmission of public opinion to the president and other policymakers is essential.

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Naval Arms Control—View from the Pentagon

92UF0146D Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 91 (signed to press 16 Sep 91) pp 60-66

[Article by Igor Fedorovich Bocharov, captain 1st rank reserve, candidate of technical sciences, and senior scientific associate and consultant at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] After the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe was concluded last fall and the Soviet-American treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction was signed this summer, naval arms control (NAC) became one of the main problems on the road to disarmament. The leaders in these weapons, just as in most others, are the USSR and the United States.

In April 1991 the U.S. Defense Department prepared a report on naval arms control in response to the request of the two congressional committees on the armed services—the Senate and House committees—for information on the correspondence of NAC measures to national security interests.¹

Above all, this document is interesting because of the extremely thorough examination of Soviet proposals in this sphere. As the authors remarked, they were guided by the provisions of the "National Security Strategy" the U.S. administration adopted in 1990 (unfortunately, the USSR does not have any officially adopted and published document of this kind yet, and now it obviously cannot have one until after the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States has been signed). The basic premises of the "Strategy" include stronger stability (for the purpose of reducing the danger of attack), better forecasts of the development of armed forces (for the purpose of lessening the fear of aggression), effective verification, and an uncompromising view of the security of allies.

With a view to these basic premises, the Pentagon experts tried to assess submitted NAC proposals as a basis for the negotiation and conclusion of an agreement. These proposals are the subject of intense debates by the scientific and military-political communities and the public in the United States, the NATO countries, and the USSR. It is this latter

fact that should probably arouse greater interest in the report of the U.S. Defense Department.

Any analysis of probable bilateral and multilateral NAC measures, the report stresses, should be conducted with consideration for the diverse functions of naval forces (not only the guarantee of national security, but also, for example, the guarding of trade routes, the defense of the international law of the sea, etc.) and the complexity of the environment in which they function. Special importance is assigned to the following three factors:

1. The fundamental geostrategic asymmetries between the potential parties to NAC negotiations, primarily the United States and the USSR;

2. The resulting differences in the functions of their naval forces;

3. The need for the additional analysis of NAC proposals outside the context of East-West relations.

Geostrategic asymmetries arose because the well-being of the United States depends largely on transoceanic economic and political ties. On the political level, the United States' international economic dependence is reflected in the seven main agreements on the safety of shipping, signed by a total of 43 states. The U.S. Navy plays the key role in the global defense of trade routes. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is viewed as a Eurasian land power in the document, the vital interests of which, with the exception of some coastal regions, do not depend to any considerable extent on maritime communications. For this reason, the USSR Navy, the authors write, is primarily expected to defend territory, guard the coast, and impede the use of sea lines of communication by the United States and its allies in wartime.

From the "para bellum" standpoint, I feel that this statement sounds objective. In a time of peace, however, the report suggests a high level of superpower ambitions which could be viewed as aggressive intentions. The confines of this article preclude arguments with the authors over the idea that Russia is a "land power," an idea which has been expressed in Western literature for more than a century. I must say, however, that maritime trade is just as necessary to the USSR for its normal activity—i.e., the use of all of the advantages of international division of labor and economic contacts for its development.

As for the roles and functions of the U.S. and USSR navies, it is logical, in view of the geostrategic asymmetries, to describe the former as balanced because both navies have aircraft carriers, surface warships, submarines, amphibious (landing) forces, and logistic support forces. Submarines and land-based naval aircraft, however, represent a higher percentage of the USSR's naval forces.

In a time of conflict, the U.S. Navy is deployed far from territorial waters in order to secure the support of allies and defend sea lines of communication. The functions of the USSR Navy, the report says, are to defend its nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN's), to threaten American SSBN's, to prevent the functioning of sea lines of communication,

and to keep the attacking forces of the U.S. Navy (aircraft carriers and platforms with sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) at a distance from which they cannot destroy targets on Soviet territory.

Obviously, from the standpoint of pure military planning, these are the functions of both navies.

As for the need to examine NAC measures **outside the context of East-West relations**, I think the authors of the report said this because of the radical changes in Soviet-American relations (the lessening of the Soviet threat) and the shift in emphasis to conflicts in the Third World. The report specifically says that 21 developing countries now have 222 conventional submarines, and some of them even have nuclear-powered submarines.² This is already enough to pose a significant threat to the American Navy in view of the fact that 40 countries in the world have 376 conventional submarines (the developing states with the highest number of submarines are India with 16, Peru with 11, Egypt with 10, and Pakistan with 9).

In fact, the realities of international development have clearly shown that the epicenter of crisis situations is moving into the Third World. This was corroborated when Iraq seized Kuwait. **In my opinion, the present situation is one in which the naval potential of the United States could play an important role when critical tendencies arise in various parts of the world, if it is used in the proper way, primarily for the prevention of serious regional conflicts and for their rapid localization and elimination.**

Which NAC proposals aroused the interest of the authors of the report? After consultations with the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, they investigated the following three groups of measures with a view to their impact on U.S. security: the limitation or total prohibition of the tactical nuclear naval arms of the USSR and United States, bilateral limits on nuclear-powered attack submarines, and confidence-building measures in the naval sphere.

In the case of the **complete or partial prohibition of tactical sea-based nuclear weapons**, the USSR would still have these weapons on naval aircraft deployed on airfields on land, according to the authors of the report, even in the event of a total ban. Therefore, they feel that the ban would apply only to the United States. Besides this, they effectively deny the possibility of verifying this process without highly "intrusive" measures, which would impose unacceptable restrictions on the freedom of naval operations.

The Pentagon's conceptual approach to an agreement on quantitative limits of these weapons is based on the assumption that the United States deploys these weapons as a deterrent and as a means of fighting a war, and the quantity therefore does not depend on the structure and dimensions of the Soviet arsenal. Once again, they stress the need for reliable verification, because SLCM's are dual-purpose weapons.

The authors assert that the Soviet Union wants to keep SLCM's with a range of under 600 kilometers (which are the

most numerous in the USSR arsenal) and land-based naval aircraft outside the confines of the talks on tactical sea-based nuclear weapons.

Their line of reasoning sounds somewhat contradictory: For example, although the authors assert that the USSR does not want to include tactical sea-based nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons of naval aircraft deployed on land in the talks, they also cite the statement Marshal S. Akhromeyev made to the Senate Subcommittee on Armed Forces Planning and Regional Defense in May 1990, when he first mentioned the possibility of conducting talks on carrier-based aircraft and land-based naval aircraft. Obviously, if both sides are interested in resolving these contradictions, a compromise could be found—while maintaining the necessary level of stability and minimizing the danger of conflict.

It seems that sea- and land-based tactical nuclear weapons should be discussed as a single entity. After all, we cannot escape the fact that the tactical nuclear weapons of U.S. carrier-based aircraft, and especially the nuclear SLCM's, are certainly capable of reaching many of the targets on land which have been recorded as targets of the land-based tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the talks on which, according to the Paris Charter, should have already begun.

In their discussion of the possibility of talks on **mutual bilateral limits on American and Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN's)**, the authors of the report conclude that these limits would have an adverse effect on U.S. national security, primarily for the following reasons:

Because of the United States' unique geostrategic status, it needs a large number of submarines of precisely this type—regardless of the number the USSR has, because these are distinguished by virtually unlimited endurance and ability to stand up in combat during the fulfillment of the United States' global commitments in peacetime and wartime.

The reduction of the number of SSN's would give the USSR an advantage in submarine attack forces because it has many conventional (diesel) submarines, which the United States does not have, and which, despite their limited combat capabilities, could still pose a serious threat to U.S. sea lines of communication.

Outside the Soviet-American context, the reduction of SSN's would affect the United States' ability to withstand the submarine forces of Third World countries.

The reduction of the number of SSN's built in the United States would lead to the loss of part of the production capacities and research and development base in this sphere, and this would ultimately affect the United States' ability to restore—if necessary—submarine forces on a modern technological level.

From the standpoint of formal logic, these reasons reinforce the United States' reluctance to reduce the number of SSN's, but this approach is somewhat counterproductive because the United States would like, according to the authors of the report, to include all types of attack submarines, both nuclear and conventional ones, in the reduction process. The authors suggest that the USSR would agree to this only if the submarine forces of the United States' Western allies

were to be included in the talks. It seems to me that, in view of the increasingly apparent intention of the USSR to join the civilized world military-political and economic communities, it would be open to the broadest compromises in this area as well. After all, even at the time of the crucial developments in domestic politics in the second half of 1990 and the beginning of 1991, the Soviet leadership agreed to give the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf political support. I do not think that the states belonging to the new Union will continue to pay without question for the maintenance of a fleet of diesel submarines that even exceeds the number of American SSN's.

In reference to the possibility of verifying the limits on this type of submarine, the authors of the report remark that "the most serious loophole in any verification system would be the possibility of transferring the functions of the SSN to other platforms (for example, conventional submarines) which the USSR has and the United States does not have."

Therefore, the Americans are concerned mainly about the Soviet conventional submarines. In my opinion, however, they present an even greater problem to us. In addition to the previously discussed military-political aspects of the problem, there are equally significant military-economic aspects: the expenditure of large quantities of material and technical resources at a time of acute shortages on the regular maintenance and combat operations of hundreds of diesel attack submarines, 75 percent of which were adopted before 1970; the need to man these submarines with highly trained crews at a time of a general shortage of personnel in all branches of the armed forces.

Confidence-building measures are analyzed in sufficient detail in the report, with a view to all of the Soviet proposals in this sphere. The authors say that the "purpose of confidence-building measures is to promote openness, transparency, and predictability in order to alleviate tension and reduce the probability of conflict due to errors and misunderstandings. In general, these measures are intended to shed light on normal operations, and not to limit them in any way."

I would like to comment on the last part of this definition of the purpose of confidence-building measures in the naval sphere. The Pentagon resolutely opposes some of the measures the Soviet Union has proposed precisely because they envisage certain limitations. The USSR's proposals on the limitation or regulation of naval activity on a regional (or geographic) basis are viewed from the same vantage point.

Acceptable **geographic limits**, guaranteeing the safety of international straits, fishing zones, shipping lanes, and internal seas (the Mediterranean, for example), according to the authors, are regulated by the 1972 and 1989 agreements between the USSR and the United States.³ The open seas should be open to all, and many countries (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Pakistan, Malaysia, the NATO countries, and some East European states) approve of the presence of the U.S. Navy there. They also cite the argument that a geographic limitation that seems acceptable at one time could change under the influence of changes in the international situation and could become an obstacle, for example,

to UN sanctions. During the war in the Persian Gulf, for example, the American SSN's accompanying carrier task forces carried SLCM's capable of reaching targets on Soviet territory, and if there had been a geographic limit on the use of this region, they would have been prohibited to sail through it.

In reference to **limits on naval exercises**, they say that this would benefit only the Soviet Union, because it conducts these exercises near its own coastline with a small number of ships, partly to economize on material resources. The United States and its allies feel a "fundamental need for large-scale exercises" to coordinate their actions and provide personnel with the necessary professional training. Consequently, this proposal is unacceptable, and so is the next one:

This is the proposal of **special zones** where the deployment of various types of naval weapons or certain types of naval activity (for example, submarine operations) would be prohibited. The reason is the impossibility of verifying these limitations. The United States does, however, support the idea of nuclear-free zones in the seas, which would curb the proliferation of these weapons and would not jeopardize Western security interests.

The **advance notification and observation of exercises**, in the opinion of the United States, could be conducted reliably from the outside by national technical means of verification. The presence of observers on board ships could give them access to the advance technology of Western navies and information about the tactics of the U.S. Navy's interaction with the naval forces of allies.

Less binding notification requirements or less intrusive verification could be acceptable in principle, but the consent to these measures, in the opinion of the authors of the report, would create unnecessary precedents and signify tacit approval of attempts to limit the operations of the U.S. Navy and the freedom of the seas.

The **exchange of information about naval forces**, according to the authors, would help to establish openness and transparency with regard to the armed forces and their activities. The exchange of information could promote the negotiation of confidence-building measures.

The United States and many other countries already publish detailed and extensive information about their naval forces. Obviously, the Soviet Union should make information about its Navy equally accessible.

In general, the leadership of the U.S. Armed Forces objects to confidence-building measures in the naval sphere: "The viability of geostrategic asymmetries, the unique structures of alliances, and the dependence of critical response, regional stability, international trade, and economic growth on the Navy will require the United States to continue resisting the abovementioned confidence-building measures in the naval sphere."

The United States does not completely reject the idea of confidence-building measures, however. Several measures are already in place, particularly those strengthening the fundamental naval principles, such as freedom of the seas

and the right of peaceful and unimpeded passage through territorial waters, and those contributing to mutual understanding in the naval sphere. One example of these is the bilateral Soviet-American agreement on dangerous military activity, which went into force on 1 January 1990.

Numerous Soviet proposals on confidence-building measures in the naval sphere are described as impracticable. This description sounds fairly objective. The very fact that the USSR still has not begun the regular and official notification of the public, or even the deputies of the supreme legislative bodies of the Union and the republics, of naval organizational plans attests to the somewhat declarative nature of the Soviet proposals on confidence-building measures in the naval sphere.

Nevertheless, there is evidence of an old stereotype in the Pentagon's approach to the reduction of military confrontation between the USSR and the United States in the oceans and a tendency to ignore the need, dictated by the development of the international situation, for cooperation in the resolution of security issues. Pentagon experts have rejected virtually all multilateral NAC agreements, for example, saying that they can only be effective if they are limited in scope and apply to one specific situation. In particular, this is the reason for the authors' rejection of Sweden's proposal of multilateral consultations for the purpose of concluding a treaty similar to the existing bilateral agreements on maritime incidents.

In my opinion, in the case of the Arctic region, because of its unique geostrategic status (as a highly confined body of water with a high degree of naval activity, primarily by the submarine forces of only the NATO countries and the USSR), it would not be too difficult, but it would be important from the military-political and ecological standpoints, to discuss the conclusion of a multilateral agreement to prevent dangerous military activity and secure mutual assistance in the event of accidents on naval ships. This would also represent a significant step toward the materialization of the widely acknowledged principle of cooperative security, as well as the first element of the structure of this kind of security in the seas. Or will this be another one of those situations in which it takes 20 years for politicians to follow the advice of scientists?

In conclusion, I have to say that all of the USSR's efforts in the last 5 years to lead the United States to the negotiating table for the discussion of limits on naval arms and naval activity have been unproductive. Obviously, there have been objective reasons for this, especially the universal nature of the navy's role as a military-political instrument even at a time of departure from rigid military confrontation in relations between the USSR and the United States. It would probably be absurd to dispute the right of each nation to have the kind of navy it deems necessary and possible, but this must be accompanied by the unconditional admission that the activities of this navy should not pose an unprovoked threat to the other side and should be conducted within the confines of the international law of the sea, in line with international, multilateral, and bilateral agreements, sanctions, and resolutions of the United Nations.

In general, we will have to resolve the contradiction between the right of nations to practice sovereign military organizational development and the unconditional guarantee of the security of other nations. Obviously, the present level of civilization is conducive to the recognition and adoption of the only productive model of security—cooperative security based on compromises for a balance of military-political and economic interests, with the broadest possible participation of the United Nations.

As for the confrontation in the naval sphere between the USSR and the United States and the USSR's concern about the fundamental ability of the U.S. Navy to deliver strikes with nuclear and conventional weapons throughout much of the territory of the USSR, it seems to me that these problems could be solved by planning acceptable measures for interaction by the U.S. and USSR navies in forms that would not impose any limits on the autonomous operation of the navies but would allow each side to feel certain of the absence of aggressive intentions on the other side. Unfortunately, all of this is still on the level of good intentions, but there is also the proposal that the USSR and the United States start working in earnest toward this.

It is most likely that this cooperation would take the form of interaction by the navies of the United States and the USSR in the prevention of regional crises in accordance with UN resolutions. The political possibility of these actions was already demonstrated during the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

Footnotes

1. "Report on Naval Arms Control. Submitted to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Armed Services," Department of Defense, April 1991.
2. It is true that the Pentagon analysts included the PRC (88 diesel and 4 nuclear-powered submarines) among the Third World countries, as well as the DPRK (23), Yugoslavia (9), Bulgaria (4), Poland (4), and Romania (1).
3. This is a reference to the Soviet-American agreements of 1972 on the prevention of incidents in the open seas and the air space above them and of 1989 on the prevention of dangerous military activity. The report cites some other documents which prove, in the authors' opinion, that the United States supports the kind of confidence-building measures in the naval sphere that would heighten security on the seas. These are the agreement on the advance notification of ICBM and SLBM launches of 31 May 1988 and the joint Soviet-American statements on respect for the right of peaceful passage through territorial waters and on the exchange of visits by naval ships in 1989.

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[Text]

August

6—The Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet appointed Aleksandr Arzumanyan to represent the Republic of Armenia in the United States and Canada. Information disseminated in connection with the appointment indicates that the duties of the new representative will include the consolidation of direct ties with Armenian organizations and the Armenian community in the United States and Canada and the coordination of aid to this republic from these countries.

15—According to a report in the NEW YORK TIMES, U.S. banks refused to participate in the extension of large credits to the Soviet Union for the purchase of American grain.

17—A day before the attempted coup in the USSR, the CIA predicted that "conservatives in the Kremlin are ready to make their move against President Gorbachev." The prediction was included in the daily collection of news items and analytical materials the agency in Langley prepares for distribution to the highest-ranking members of the administration.

19—George Bush cut his vacation short and returned to the White House. The President of the United States consulted his top advisers on the situation in the Soviet Union and then issued a written statement condemning the state of emergency.

20—George Bush held a press conference in the White House and reported that Robert Strauss had been sworn in as the new U.S. ambassador to the USSR. He would be leaving for Moscow without delay to take a closer look at the situation. He would not be submitting his credentials, because the United States did not recognize the putschists. Bush denied the possibility of military pressure by the United States or other Western countries on the USSR, but he did say that all diplomatic means would be used to promote the triumph of democracy in the Soviet Union, and that the United States would support B. Yeltsin, the elected leader of the Russian people.

26—The Buto-Catalog commercial news center began offering its services to Soviet businessmen in the legal registration of enterprises in California. Business Management International is the center's American partner.

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Articles Not Translated

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